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Moral dilemmas often pose dramatic and gut-wrenching emotional choices. It is now widely
accepted that emotions are not simply experienced alongside people’s judgments about
moral dilemmas, but that our affective processes play a central role in determining those
judgments. However, much of the evidence purporting to demonstrate the connection
between people’s emotional responses and their judgments about moral dilemmas has
recently been called into question. In the present studies, we reexamined the role of emo-
tion in people’s judgments about moral dilemmas using a validated self-report measure of
emotion. We measured participants’ specific emotional responses to moral dilemmas and,
although we found that moral dilemmas evoked strong emotional responses, we found that
these responses were only weakly correlated with participants’moral judgments. We argue
that the purportedly strong connection between emotion and judgments of moral dilemmas
may have been overestimated.
Introduction
How do we decide whether an act is morally right or wrong? Though this question has a long
history, the nature of the controversies surrounding moral decision-making has not fundamen-
tally changed. Historically, there has been debate between philosophers who stressed the role
of reason and deliberation in moral judgment (e.g., [1]) and those who argued that moral judg-
ments are driven by emotional processes (e.g., [2–3]). These contrasting emphases are also evi-
dent in the course of psychological research on moral judgment. Early investigations were
chiefly concerned with how morality was shaped through cognitive development (e.g., [4]).
More recently however, a great deal of research has focused on the role of emotion in moral
decision-making (e.g., [5–12]). These and other recent insights into the psychological processes
involved in moral judgment have reinvigorated normative ethical debates about our moral
obligations to ourselves and others (e.g., [9, 13–15]).
Theories of moral judgment have tended to emphasize the influence of either reason or
emotion to moral judgment. However, it is quite likely that both of these capacities play a role
in everyday moral evaluation. The roles of both of reason and emotion are integrated in the
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dual-process theory of moral judgment [7,16]. According to the dual-process theory, cold rea-
soning processes are recruited when making utilitarian moral judgments, but these judgments
can be preempted by hot affective processes that lead people to make deontological moral judg-
ments. Contemplating the violation of a moral rule elicits a strong negative emotional reaction
that tends to elicit disapproval toward the violation. However, when violating the rule would
bring about a better moral outcome, this prepotent response can be overridden by deliberative
processes, leading to utilitarian approval for the action. The signatures of these two processes
are thought to be evident in the so-called personal-impersonal distinction: researchers have
found that people are less likely to approve of sacrificing one person to save others if a dilemma
requires an “up-close-and-personal” action, such as physically pushing someone to their death,
than if a dilemma requires an action that operates at greater distance, such as flipping a switch
that leads to someone’s death. The dual-process theory has become very influential within the
field of moral psychology over the last decade, and it is now widely accepted that people are
less likely to approve of personal violations because they evoke strong emotional reactions
compared to impersonal actions (e.g., [6, 7, 17–21], but see [22]).
Reexamining the relationship between emotion and judgment in moral
dilemmas
The largest and most widely-cited body of evidence for the role of emotion in judgments of
moral dilemmas, and for the dual-process theory, has come from research examining people’s
judgments about a single battery of moral dilemmas (henceforth, the standard battery; e.g., [6,
7, 17, 19, 20]). Most prominently, several neuroimaging studies have examined people’s judg-
ments about dilemmas taken from the standard battery. For instance, in two studies, Greene
et al. [6, 7] found increased activation in brain areas associated with emotion when participants
made judgments about personal dilemmas, and increased activation in areas associated with
reasoning processes when they considered impersonal dilemmas (but see [23]). In other stud-
ies, researchers demonstrated similar effects using psychophysiological measures of affect (e.g.,
[20]) and when examining clinical populations with ventromedial prefrontal cortex lesions (an
area of the brain thought to be critically involved in emotion and emotion regulation; e.g., [17,
19]).
However, there are problems with the standard battery [24–27]. Of particular concern is the
fact that personal dilemmas in the standard battery more often involve physically harming a
moral patient than do impersonal dilemmas. In fact, it appears that all of the personal dilem-
mas in the standard battery involve physical harm, whereas only half of the impersonal moral
dilemmas do. This is potentially problematic, as the harmfulness of an action ought to be
orthogonal to its up-close-and-personal nature. What’s more, it appears that personal dilem-
mas in the standard battery tend to involve more graphic and grisly descriptions of harm than
do impersonal dilemmas, even when focusing only on impersonal dilemmas involving harm.
For example, personal dilemmas ask participants to consider cutting off a man’s head, smoth-
ering a baby, or subjecting children to painful medical experiments. In contrast, impersonal
dilemmas ask participants to consider venting deadly fumes into a room or voting for a new
environmental policy that will harm people.
Researchers using the standard battery have often argued that the “closeness” of personal
moral actions elicits a strong negative emotional reaction that in turn leads participants to
make deontological moral judgments. Yet, one possibility is that researchers have observed
stronger emotional reactions to personal dilemmas because the personal dilemmas in the stan-
dard battery more often involved grisly and harmful actions than did the impersonal dilemmas,
and not because of the closeness of personal actions. If so, then prior studies may have only
Emotion and Moral Judgment
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shown that graphic descriptions of harmful acts are emotionally salient. Thus, many studies
taken to provide evidence for the dual-process theory may not provide a strong test of the cen-
tral claim of the theory. That is, it is unclear whether emotional responses explain the differ-
ence in people’s judgments about personal and impersonal dilemmas or whether the observed
differences are due to confounds in the stimuli.
Setting aside concerns about the standard battery, there is little work on precisely which
emotions are involved in judgments of moral dilemmas. Further, there is no work to our
knowledge demonstrating the causal strength of these emotional reactions. There is compelling
evidence that disgust and anger are elicited in judgments about norm violations such as com-
mitting incest or suicide [5, 8–12, 28], but the neuroimaging studies that provide evidence for
the role of emotional processes in moral judgments have not directly measured which emotions
are involved in judgments of moral dilemmas.
In addition, very little work has examined the extent to which emotional processes are
causally related to the moral judgments of neurotypical individuals (but see [19]). Whereas a
number of researchers have argued that incidental emotional states can affect judgments of
simple norm violations (e.g., [5, 12] but see [28]), attempts to demonstrate these effects on
judgments about moral dilemmas have produced inconsistent results (e.g., [29–32]). Mean-
while, reaction time data (e.g., [6, 7; 33]) and experiments examining speed-pressure [34, 35]
and cognitive load manipulations [16, 35] suggest that deliberative reasoning is crucial for
utilitarian judgments—utilitarian judgments are sometimes slower, and seem to be impaired
by speed-pressure and increased cognitive load—however, these findings cannot determine
whether characteristically emotional processes produce deontological judgments. Rather, the
current data only suggest that deontological judgments are produced by some sort of auto-
matic or intuitive process. If the automatic processes involved in moral judgment are truly
affective processes, then their operation ought to be accompanied by the qualitative experi-
ence of emotion, which is most easily measured by asking participants to report their emo-
tional experiences.
Altogether, the current state of the literature suggests that more research is necessary to
establish the role of emotion in judgments of moral dilemmas. If confounds in the standard
battery affect participants’ emotional reactions, then it needs to be determined whether prior
findings—that is, those demonstrating a connection between emotions and judgments of
moral dilemmas—were a result of these confounds or of genuine affective differences between
personal and impersonal dilemmas. In addition, existing research does not tell us what types of
emotional responses are involved in judgments of moral dilemmas, nor does it inform us as to
the strength of the relationship between people’s emotional responses and their moral judg-
ments. Thus, we aim to reassess the extent to which emotional responses explain the difference
between personal and impersonal judgments when the confounds in the standard battery are
eliminated, and importantly, what specific emotions explain this difference.
We should point out that, as Greene et al. [36] have noted, the value of the dual-process
theory of moral judgment does not depend on its ability to explain the personal-impersonal
distinction. Furthermore, there are a variety of dual-process models that make no particular
claims about the role of emotion in deontological moral judgment, either because they do not
associate specific processes with specific moral judgments (e.g., as discussed by [35]), or
because they dichotomize moral judgments along other lines (e.g., [37–41]). Nonetheless,
one highly influential dual-process theory originally argued for by Greene et al. [7] and still
frequently discussed by many other researchers, predicts that people’s emotional reactions
are causally related to deontological moral judgments and that the signatures of this effect is
evident in the personal-impersonal distinction. This is the dual-process theory we aim to
test.
Emotion and Moral Judgment
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The Present Research
Our goal was to examine the role of emotions in judgments of moral dilemmas using a self-report
emotion measure. Self-report measures afford two important benefits: they allow us to identify
the specific emotions involved in judgments of moral dilemmas and to assess the strength of the
connections between these emotions and moral judgments. There are, of course, limitations to
using self-report measures as well. Chief among them is the fact that self-report measures are
only suitable when the emotions of interest are available to conscious introspection.
To begin to address this concern, in Experiment 1 we validated our self-report emotion
measure by examining people’s emotional responses to the standard battery. Based on the find-
ings of prior neuroimaging studies that have examined people’s judgments about the standard
battery, we expected to find significant differences between the emotions elicited by personal
and impersonal dilemmas in this battery.
In Experiment 2, we conducted a norming study and confirmed that participants rated per-
sonal dilemmas from the standard battery as both more harmful and graphic than impersonal
dilemmas. On the basis of these findings, we revised a battery of matched personal and imper-
sonal dilemmas originally created by Moore et al. [26]. We then experimentally confirmed that
these dilemmas were matched for harm and graphicness (though they were actually more
graphic and harmful on average than the standard battery). Finally, in Experiment 3 we reex-
amined the role of emotion in moral judgments of dilemmas in the revised battery.
General Methods
Participants
Participants were recruited online from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk work distribution website.
After recruitment, participants were redirected to a Qualtrics website where the experiment
was administered. Before advancing to the experiment, participants indicated consent by click-
ing a checkbox and could only continue in the experiment if they consented. These experi-
ments were approved by the UCLA Institutional Research Board, IRB 12–000063. Participants
were paid $0.60 to participate in Experiments 1 and 3, and $0.75 to participate in Experiment
2. Attention checks were conducted and timings were recorded to ensure participants paid
attention while completing the study.
Materials: Standard Battery
The standard battery, first examined by Greene et al. [7], is composed of 44 moral vignettes
describing situations in which a moral decision must be made. Each vignette describes an
action which must be taken to avoid an undesirable outcome, but which comes at the cost of
another undesirable outcome. These vignettes are divided into two groups: personal moral
dilemmas (25 dilemmas) and impersonal moral dilemmas (19 dilemmas). Personal moral
dilemmas involve more intimate and direct moral actions than impersonal dilemmas. Within
and between these conditions, the vignettes range over a wide variety of situations and actions,
from donating to a charitable organization, to pushing a man in front of a train.
Materials: Revised Battery
We compiled a new set of moral dilemmas to address the concerns we raised about the stan-
dard battery (see S1 File). Most of these scenarios were created by modifying the materials orig-
inally created by Moore et al. [26]. We modified their materials to further improve the match
between personal and impersonal versions of a given dilemma. The revised battery included
eight different scenarios (one personal and one impersonal vignette for each scenario for a total
Emotion and Moral Judgment
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of 16 vignettes). In these dilemmas, a moral patient must be harmed in order to maximize utility.
For each scenario, a pair of personal and impersonal vignettes were matched as closely as possi-
ble, save for the intimacy and directness of the action considered in the vignette. For instance, in
the “Space Station” scenario, a fire threatens to break out in the international space station unless
a module is vented of oxygen. Unfortunately, an astronaut is trying to exit the module, and his
presence in the doorway will prevent the fire safety system from activating. In the personal ver-
sion of this scenario, the astronaut is stuck in the doorway, and participants must consider
whether or not to push him back into the module so that the fire system will be activated. This
action will kill him but will save the others on the station. In the impersonal version of the sce-
nario, participants must consider whether to press a switch that will seal the doorway before the
astronaut reaches it, with the same consequences as the personal scenario [25].
Emotion Measure: Positive and Negative Affect Schedule—Expanded
Form
In Experiments 1 and 3 we measured participants’ emotional responses to moral dilemmas
using scales from the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule expanded form (PANAS-X), a
comprehensive emotional state, trait, and mood self-report measure [42, 43]. In our study, we
used the PANAS-X as a state emotion measure. The PANAS-X is among the most commonly
used self-report measures of emotion (according to Google Scholar, Watson et al.’s paper [43]
has been cited over 15,000 times at the time of this writing). The PANAS-X asks participants to
rate the extent to which they are experiencing a number of different emotions, on a scale from
1 (very slightly or not at all) to 5 (extremely). The measure is composed of subscales, each of
which is composed of several emotion words. We presented participants with the positive and
negative affect scales, as well as the guilt, hostility, and joviality scales. Table 1 provides more
detail about the variety of emotion words that participants rated.
The Hostility scale includes emotion words like “anger” and “disgust,” which we anticipated
would be relevant to moral decisions based on prior research examining norm violations (e.g.,
[5, 8–12, 28]). We also chose to measure emotional responses using the Guilt scale because the
experience of guilt may serve adaptive functions in deterring moral violations and in regulating
relationships affected by norm violations (e.g., [44–47]). Finally, the Positive Affect and Jovial-
ity scales were used along with the Negative affect scale as general measures of positive and
negative affect, respectively.
Filler Task
We used a filler task to reduce any memory effects caused by repeated administrations of the
PANAS-X. Participants were presented with three images taken from theWhere’s Waldo book
series. Participants were asked to search for Waldo, and to click on him when they found him.
Table 1. Items included in each of the PANAS-X scales.
Negative Affect
(10)
afraid, scared, nervous, jittery, irritable, hostile, guilty, ashamed, upset, distressed
Positive Affect (10) active, alert, attentive, determined, enthusiastic, excited, inspired, interested, proud,
strong
Hostility (6) angry, hostile, irritable, scornful, disgusted, loathing
Guilt (6) guilty, ashamed, blameworthy, angry at self, disgusted with self, dissatisfied with self
Joviality (8) happy, joyful, delighted, cheerful, excited, enthusiastic, lively, energetic
Note. The number of terms comprising each scale is shown in parentheses.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0154780.t001
Emotion and Moral Judgment
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Catch Questions
All experiments included catch questions to identify participants who were not paying atten-
tion, or were clicking through the study. These questions were embedded in the response
scales, and instructed participants to choose a specific response option. For instance, a catch
question embedded in the emotion measure was, “For this item please respond ‘a little’.”
Experiment 1
As discussed, in Experiment 1 we sought to validate our emotion measure by reproducing
prior results demonstrating that personal dilemmas from the standard battery elicit stronger
emotional reactions than impersonal dilemmas from the standard battery.
Participants
We recruited 266 participants to participate in Experiment 1. Of these, 141 participants were
female and 125 were male, with mean age of 32.8 years old (SD = 11.51).
Materials
In Experiment 1, moral dilemmas were assigned between-subjects; each participant read one of
the 44 moral dilemma vignettes from the standard battery, reproduced verbatim from Greene
et al. [7]. Miller & Cushman [48] have argued that action-directed emotions, in particular, are
most strongly connected to moral judgments. Consequently, we added an additional sentence to
the end of each moral dilemma to direct participants’ attention to the moral action they needed
to consider before rating their emotions. For instance, for the “Standard Trolley” dilemma this
sentence read, “You are thinking about flipping the switch in order to save the five workmen.”
Procedure
After collecting demographic information, participants were directed to complete an emotion
pre-test. Participants were asked to rate how they were feeling at the present moment using the
PANAS-X. This established a baseline for each participant’s emotional state upon entering the
study, however this procedure is not necessary to achieve the results we will report henceforth
(see [49]). A catch item was included within the emotion scale to ensure participants paid atten-
tion. After completing the pre-test, participants completed the filler task (described above).
Participants were then randomly assigned to read a personal or impersonal moral dilemma
(participants only read one dilemma). Participants assigned to the personal condition read one
of the 25 personal moral dilemmas, and participants in the impersonal condition read one of
the 19 impersonal moral dilemmas. Between four and seven participants were assigned to each
dilemma (median = 6 per dilemma). After reading a moral dilemma, participants completed
the emotion post-test, rating their emotions using the PANAS-X scales a second time. Partici-
pants were given specific instructions to rate their emotions as they were currently experienc-
ing them. These instructions read, “Having read the story, how do you feel right now? Please
indicate how you actually feel, not how you think you might have felt if you were actually in the
situation.” Then participants were presented with the PANAS-X scales. Participants generally
spent approximately one-minute completing PANAS-X scales each time (pre-test
median = 62.5s; post-test median = 64.5s). After rating their emotions, participants were asked
to make a moral judgment. They responded using a six-point labeled scale that ranged from
“completely inappropriate” to “completely appropriate.” Finally, we asked a final attention
check question in which participants were asked whether they took the experiment seriously.
The median completion time for the entire experiment was 6 minutes 53 seconds.
Emotion and Moral Judgment
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Results and Discussion
Five participants were excluded for missing at least one catch question, leaving 261 participants
in the final analyses. The exclusion of these participants did not affect the results of the study.
First, we examined participants’moral judgments, and replicated prior moral psychological
findings. Participants made more deontological moral judgments for personal dilemmas
(Mean = 2.82, SD = 1.915) than for impersonal dilemmas (mean = 3.47, SD = 2.00), t(259) =
-2.67, p = .009, 95% CI of the difference[.165 to 1.121], d = .33). Next, we examined the effect
of reading moral dilemmas on participants’ emotional states by computing an emotional reac-
tion score. We calculated an emotion reaction score for each subscale by subtracting partici-
pants’ pre-test emotion ratings from their post-test emotion ratings on each scale. Mean
emotional reaction scores for each condition are shown in Fig 1. Reading both personal and
impersonal moral dilemmas led to increased negative emotions (negative affect, guilt, hostility),
and decreased positive emotions (positive affect, joviality), when compared to pre-test emo-
tional states.
We conducted a series of 2 x 2 ANOVAs, one for each emotion subscale (summarized in
Table 2). We examined two factors with these ANOVAs: a within-subjects Emotional Reaction
factor comparing pre-test scores and post-test scores, and a between-subjects Condition factor
comparing personal and impersonal dilemmas. Within each ANOVA, the main effect of the
Emotional Reaction factor tested whether reading a moral dilemma affected participants’
Fig 1. Mean emotion difference scores for PANAS-X subscales across personal and impersonal
conditions in Experiment 1. Error bars represent ±1 standard error.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0154780.g001
Table 2. Summary of ANOVAs conducted on emotion ratings of participants in Experiment 1. The Emotional Reaction factor has been abbreviated as
“Reaction.”
Positive Affect Negative Affect Hostility Guilt Joviality
Effect df F p η2 F p η2 F p η2 F p η2 F p η2
Reaction 1 79.9 < .001 .058 125 < .001 .134 114 < .001 .109 71.5 < .001 .088 148 < .001 .113
Condition 1 8.63 .004 .024 8.67 .004 .019 18.3 < .001 .040 2.66 .104 .006 7.38 .007 .019
Interaction 1 3.04 .082 .002 14.5 < .001 .015 32.6 < .001 .031 5.50 .02 .007 7.73 .006 .006
Error 259
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0154780.t002
Emotion and Moral Judgment
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emotional state, and the interaction between Emotional Reaction and Condition factors tested
whether the change in participants’ emotional state was greater for personal dilemmas than for
impersonal dilemmas. We observed a significant Emotional Reaction effect for every subscale,
indicating that both personal and impersonal dilemmas elicited emotional reactions. We also
observed significant interactions between the Emotional Reaction factor and Condition for the
negative affect, guilt, hostility, and joviality subscales.
These interactions indicate that considering a personal dilemma led to significantly greater
emotional changes than considering an impersonal dilemma, reproducing the widely reported
personal-impersonal emotion effect using a self-report emotion measure. However, we also
observed that reading a moral dilemma simpliciter led to increased negative emotions and
decreased positive emotions across both personal and impersonal dilemmas, and this effect
accounted for the greatest proportion of variance among the effects we examined.
We also tested for correlations between participants’ emotion reaction scores for each emo-
tion scale and their moral judgments. We observed a small but reliable correlation between
changes in Hostility and people’s moral judgments (r =—.178, p = .004). Surprisingly, we
observed no reliable correlations between moral judgments and Positive Affect (r = .110, p =
.077), Negative Affect (r =—.065, p = .294), Guilt (r = -.089, p = .152), or Joviality (r = .063, p =
.307). If decreased approval for actions in personal dilemmas are a result of stronger emotional
reactions, we may expect this relationship to be reflected in correlations between moral judg-
ments and emotional reactions. However, caution should be exercised in interpreting these cor-
relations because, as we have noted, there are other systematic differences between personal
and impersonal moral dilemmas in the standard battery that may have attenuated this
relationship.
Experiment 2
Many psychologists and philosophers have argued that people’s stronger emotional responses
to personal dilemmas explain the differences in their judgments about personal and impersonal
moral dilemmas. However, this interpretation may be unwarranted if emotional differences
between these dilemmas can be explained by uncontrolled factors in the standard battery. The
most notable difference we observed between personal and impersonal moral dilemmas is the
amount of physical harm and graphicness of the descriptions in personal dilemmas. To deter-
mine whether this issue was as problematic as we suspected, we performed a norming study on
the standard battery and the revised battery.
It should be noted that the findings of this study does not bear on the veracity of the dual-
process theory of moral judgment, nor on the role of emotion in the personal-impersonal dis-
tinction, nor on the role of emotion in moral judgment more generally. However, identifying
confounds in the standard battery may impugn some of the evidence taken to support the
dual-process theory of moral judgment.
Participants
We collected responses from 256 participants for this experiment. Of these, 100 were female
and 156 were male. Their mean age was 31.90 years old (SD = 10.90).
Materials and Procedure
After responding to demographic questions, participants were randomly assigned to read four
personal and four impersonal vignettes from either the standard battery or from our revised
battery of moral dilemmas.
Emotion and Moral Judgment
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Participants were instructed to first read each vignette and then to rate their agreement with
each of the statements that composed the Harm (α = .80) and Graphicness (α = .81) scales
(both scales can be found in S1 File). A catch item was included in both scales to ensure partici-
pants were paying attention. After participants made these ratings, the vignette remained on
the screen while they were asked to make a moral judgment about the vignette. Vignettes were
presented in a random order and the ordering of the harm and graphicness scales, as well as
the items that compose these scales, were randomized.
For both the harm and graphicness scales, participants were asked to rate their agreement
with five statements, two of which were reverse coded. The harm scale included statements
such as, “The situation is violent.” The graphicness scale included statements such as, “The lan-
guage used to describe the situation evokes disturbing images.”
Results and Discussion
Participants who missed a catch question were excluded from analyses, leaving 215 partici-
pants. The decision to exclude these participants did not impact the results of the study. Partic-
ipants' ratings were averaged to compute harm and graphicness scores for each of the 44
vignettes in the standard battery (mean number of ratings = 29.4) and for the 16 vignettes in
the revised battery (mean number of ratings = 26.5).
The results of Experiment 2 are shown in Fig 2. First, we conducted a pair of one-way ANO-
VAs to determine if the personal dilemmas in the standard battery were viewed as more harm-
ful and more graphic than the impersonal dilemmas. Confirming our predictions, we found
that personal dilemmas were viewed as significantly more harmful than impersonal dilemmas,
F(1,43) = 25.80, p< .001, η2 = .38. Personal dilemmas were also viewed as more graphic than
impersonal dilemmas, F(1,43) = 33.66, p< .001, η2 = .45. In contrast, we observed no signifi-
cant differences between harm ratings for personal and impersonal dilemmas in the revised
battery, F(1,15) = .307, p = .588, η2 = .021. Personal dilemmas tended to be rated as more
graphic than impersonal dilemmas, but this trend was not statistically significant, F(1,15) =
3.98, p = .066, η2 = .22.
We also compared the norming ratings for the revised battery with norming ratings of
items from the standard battery using a 2 x 2 (condition x battery) ANOVA for each scale (see
Fig 2. Mean graphicness and harm ratings for items from the standard battery and the revised battery. Error
bars represent ±1 standard error.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0154780.g002
Emotion and Moral Judgment
PLOS ONE | DOI:10.1371/journal.pone.0154780 July 6, 2016 9 / 19
Fig 2). The harm ratings of both the revised personal and impersonal dilemmas were compara-
ble to the personal dilemmas in the standard battery. We observed significant differences
between personal and impersonal moral dilemmas (F(1,59) = 6.97, p = .011, η2 = .111) and
between the two batteries (F(1,59) = 8.35, p = .005, η2 = .130). Most importantly, we observed a
significant interaction (F(1,59) = 10.19, p = .002, η2 = .154), indicating that the differences
between personal and impersonal dilemmas were stronger among the moral dilemmas from
the standard battery than among those in the revised battery.
A comparison of graphicness ratings revealed a significant main effect of battery (F(1,59) =
93.00, p< .001, η2 = .624), indicating that our items weremore graphic than those in the stan-
dard battery. An ANOVA also revealed a significant effect of condition (F(1,59) = 14.38, p<
.001, η2 = .204), and a significant interaction (F(1,59) = 6.48, p = .014, η2 = .10). The significant
interactions in the ANOVAs conducted on harm and graphicness ratings demonstrate that the
differences between personal and impersonal dilemmas from the standard battery are not
driven by inherent differences in the interpretation of personal and impersonal moral dilem-
mas, but are more likely due to confounds in the dilemmas of the standard battery.
Correlational Analyses
As we hypothesized, personal and impersonal dilemmas in the standard battery were not
matched for two potentially confounding factors—how harmful the actions were and how
graphically the actions were described. In fact, we suspect that these confounding factors are
at least partially responsible for participants’ differing emotional reactions to personal and
impersonal dilemmas. To test this, we conducted an item-level analysis correlating averaged
emotional responses from Experiment 1 with the norming ratings from Experiment 2. Across
dilemmas, graphicness scores were significantly correlated with averaged scores for Negative
Affect (r(42) = .424, p = .004, 95% CI [.15 to .64]), Hostility (r(42) = .450, p = .002, 95% CI
[.18 to .66]), Guilt (r(42) = .356, p = .018, 95% CI [.07 to .59]), and Joviality (r(42) = -.391,
p = .009, 95% CI [-.62 to -.11]). Of course, many of the items in the graphicness scale ask
about the emotionality of a given moral dilemma, which may partially explain these cor-
relations. However, harm scores also appear to be more weakly correlated with affective
responses, although these correlations were not significant across items for Negative Affect
(r(42) = .277, p = .069, 95% CI [-.02 to .53]), Hostility (r(42) = .213, p = .165, 95% CI [-.09 to
.479]), Guilt (r(42) = .233, p = .129, 95% CI [-.07 to .50]), and Joviality (r(42) = -.189, p =
.218, 95% CI [-.46 to .11]).
To overcome the limited power provided by the item analysis, we also examined partici-
pant-level correlations among each individual participants’ affective responses in Experiment 1
with the normed ratings for the item that participant was assigned to read. Across participants,
harm score ratings were correlated with Negative Affect (r(259) = .155, p = .011, 95% CI [.04 to
.27]), Hostility (r(259) = .143, p = .020, 95% CI [.02 to .26]), and Guilt (r(259) = .124, p = .043,
95% CI [.003 to .24]). These correlations were weaker than the item-level correlations, likely
because of the additional variability among participants. Finally, we observed significant corre-
lations between an item’s graphicness score and participants’ emotional difference scores on
Negative Affect (r(259) = .219, 95% CI [.10 to .33], p< .001), Hostility (r(259) = .272, 95%
CI [.38 to .16], p< .001), Guilt (r(259) = .170, 95% CI [.05 to .29], p = .005), and Joviality
(r(259) = -.165, 95% CI [-.28 to -.05], p = .007).
Altogether, the results of Experiment 2, which demonstrate that stronger emotional reac-
tions to personal compared to impersonal moral dilemmas are partially explained by differ-
ences in the harm and graphicness of personal dilemmas, suggest caution in drawing strong
conclusions from prior studies that used the standardized battery.
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Experiment 3
Experiment 2 confirmed that the personal and impersonal moral dilemmas from the revised
battery do not differ in their degree of harm or graphicness. In Experiment 3 we examined par-
ticipants’ reactions to these revised dilemmas, allowing us to test whether personal dilemmas
elicit stronger emotional reactions than impersonal dilemmas, as well as the extent to which
differences in participants’ emotional responses is predictive of their moral judgments.
Recently, some researchers have moved away from explaining differences in people’s responses
to personal and impersonal moral dilemmas (e.g., [16, 50]). Instead, their research examines
differences in participants’ responses to high-conflict personal moral dilemmas. High-conflict
dilemmas are thought to be very emotionally evocative and exhibit high levels of disagreement.
Given that dilemmas in the revised battery exhibit high levels of disagreement [26] and are also
emotionally evocative, in Experiment 3 we are also able to address the role of specific emotions
in high-conflict dilemmas.
Participants
In Experiment 3, we conducted a priori power analyses to determine the necessary sample sizes
for ANOVA and correlational analyses. We wanted to ensure adequate power to detect effects
similar to those observed in Experiment 1. Among the ANOVAs conducted in Experiment 1,
the smallest significant effect was observed in participants’ emotion ratings for the Guilt sub-
scale. A power analysis conducted using Gpower [51] indicated that a total of 284 participants
would be required to achieve 99% power to detect this effect. The Hostility subscale was the
only subscale to correlate significantly with participants’moral judgments in Experiment 1 (r =
-.178). To detect similar correlations with 99% power, we determined that 568 participants
were needed.
In Experiment 3, we recruited 654 participants, anticipating that we might need to remove
some participants from our analyses for missing attention check questions. Of these partici-
pants, 359 were female and 295 were male. Their mean age was 36.02 years old (SD = 13.01).
Materials and Procedure
In Experiment 3 we used the revised battery, which includes eight moral scenarios, for a total
of 16 dilemmas (personal vs. impersonal x 8 scenarios). These dilemmas were assigned
between-subjects (for approximately 40 participants per vignette). All other materials and pro-
cedures were identical to those used in Experiment 1. Participants spent approximately one-
minute completing the PANAS-X scales (pre-test median = 67.0 s; post-test median = 71.7 s).
After completing these procedures, some participants were also asked to answer an additional
set of questions about their awareness of their emotional states using the Trait Meta-Mood
Measure [52]. We had hoped that this measure might identify those participants for whom
emotion and moral judgments would be most strongly connected. However, no differences
emerged in these analyses. Therefore, we have omitted discussion of these analyses. The
median completion time for Experiment 3 was 10 minutes 46 seconds.
Results and Discussion
Thirty-eight participants were excluded for missing at least one catch question, or for indicat-
ing that they had not paid attention when participating, leaving 616 participants in the final
analysis. Our results are unaffected by including these participants in our analyses.
As in Experiment 1, we examined participants’ emotional reactions to the revised battery of
moral dilemmas. We calculated an emotional reaction score for participants by subtracting
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their pre-test emotion ratings from their post-test emotion ratings. Mean differences for partic-
ipants in each condition are shown in Fig 3. Both personal and impersonal moral dilemmas
produced increased negative emotions (Negative Affect, Hostility, and Guilt) and decreased
positive emotions (Positive Affect and Joviality).
Just as in Experiment 1, we performed a series of 2 x 2 (Emotional Reaction x Condition)
ANOVAs for each emotion subscale (summarized in Table 3). We observed a significant emo-
tional change from pre-test to post-test for every emotion subscale. Then, we tested whether
personal dilemmas elicited stronger negative emotional reactions than impersonal dilemmas
after matching the dilemmas on graphicness and harm dimensions. To test this, we examined
the interaction between the Emotional Reaction and Condition (i.e., personal vs. impersonal)
factors. We observed significant interactions between the change in participants’ emotional
state and their assigned condition for all subscales except the positive affect and joviality scales,
indicating that personal dilemmas still elicited stronger emotional reactions than impersonal
dilemmas. These results indicate that personal dilemmas do indeed elicit greater emotional
reactions than do impersonal dilemmas, even for the revised battery of moral dilemmas.
Although we observed significant differences between the emotions elicited by personal and
impersonal dilemmas, these effects were smaller than the effects we observed in Experiment 1.
In Experiment 1, the strongest interaction effect we observed was for the Hostility subscale,
which accounted for approximately 29% as much variance as the main effect, or a ratio of
Fig 3. Mean emotion difference scores for PANAS-X subscales across personal and impersonal
conditions in Experiment 3. Error bars represent ±1 standard error.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0154780.g003
Table 3. Summary of ANOVAs conducted on emotion rating data from Experiment 3.
Positive Affect Negative Affect Hostility Guilt Joviality
Effect df F p η2 F p η2 F p η2 F p η2 F p η2
Reaction 1 274 < .001 .064 422 < .001 .198 284 < .001 .113 212 < .001 .124 598 < .001 .177
Condition 1 1.72 .220 .002 2.40 .111 .003 2.12 .146 .002 4.04 .045 .005 1.09 .297 .002
Interaction 1 2.49 .115 .0006 6.89 .009 .004 7.01 .008 .003 6.03 .014 .004 5.47 .020 .002
Error 614
Note. The Emotional Reaction factor has been abbreviated as “Reaction” and interaction terms are labeled using the first letter of each crossed factor.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0154780.t003
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approximately 3:1. In Experiment 3, the variance accounted for by the Hostility interaction
term was less than 3% of that accounted for by the main effect, or a ratio of approximately 35:1.
We compared participants’Hostility reaction scores across Experiments 1 and 3 using a 2 x 2
ANOVA (Condition x Experiment) and found a significant interaction between these experi-
ments (F(1, 873) = 10.61, p = .001, η2 = .011). This significant effect indicates that differences
in the amount of anger and disgust elicited by personal versus impersonal dilemmas were
greater in Experiment 1 than 3.
Thus, when examining matched personal and impersonal dilemmas, participant’s emo-
tional states depended much more on whether they had read a moral dilemma than on whether
that dilemma was personal or impersonal in nature. How would this affect participant’s moral
judgments about these dilemmas? Suggesting a dissociation between participants’ emotional
reactions and their moral judgments, we found that participants’moral judgments were still
significantly less approving for personal dilemmas (mean = 2.98, SD = 1.750) than impersonal
dilemmas (mean = 3.75, SD = 1.863), t(614) = 5.294, p< .001, 95% CI [.485 to 1.057], d = .42.
That is, consistent with prior findings, the personal-impersonal distinction continued to have
an important influence on participants’moral judgments, even though participants’ emotional
reactions to these dilemmas were extremely similar. Comparing participants’moral judgments
across Experiments 1 and 3 in a 2 x 2 ANOVA (Condition x Experiment) revealed no signifi-
cant main effect of Experiment (F(1, 873) = 2.467, p = .117, η2 = .002) nor any interaction
(F(1, 873) = .221, p = .639, η2 = .0002).
Thus, eliminating the confounds in the standard battery did not significantly affect the pat-
tern of moral judgments we observed among personal and impersonal dilemmas. These results
suggest that the confounds in the standard battery amplified the differences in emotions elic-
ited by personal and impersonal dilemmas, but had little effect on participants’moral judg-
ments of these dilemmas.
Correlational Analyses
We examined the relationship between each participant’s emotional states and their moral
judgments. First, we correlated participants’ difference scores for each emotion scale and their
moral judgments (see Table 4). We found significant correlations between participants’moral
judgments and the change in their Positive Affect and Hostility scores. The Hostility scale mea-
sures emotions like disgust and anger—alarm-bell emotions that researchers have hypothesized
Table 4. Correlations between emotion scales andmoral judgments after collapsing across conditions in Experiment 3 (above the diagonal). For
correlations between moral judgments and the emotion scales, 95% confidence intervals are enclosed in brackets (below the diagonal). Gender is included
as a point of reference.
Negative Affect Positive Affect Hostility Guilt Joviality Gender Moral Judgment
Neg. Affect -.265** .823** .853** -.473** .030 -.033
Pos. Affect -.246** -.289** .771** -.064 .117*
Hostility .737** -.399** .015 -.108*
Guilt -.441** -.036 < .001
Joviality -.066 .023
Gender -.180*




Coefficients without asterisks p > .1
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0154780.t004
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are important to moral judgments [e.g., 36]. Thus, our findings lend some support to research-
ers’ claims about the importance of these emotions relative to emotions like sadness or guilt.
However, the size of these correlations are conventionally small, suggesting that the dual-pro-
cess theory may have placed too great an emphasis on the role of emotion in judgments of per-
sonal moral dilemmas. Clearly, more research is necessary to draw firmer conclusions on this
matter.
Mediation analysis
We observed significant changes in participants’ feelings of Hostility between personal and
impersonal conditions, and we found that participants’ feelings on this subscale were reliably
correlated with their moral judgments. Accordingly, we performed a mediation analysis [53] to
test whether differences in moral judgments for personal and impersonal dilemmas can be
attributed to increased anger and disgust in response to personal dilemmas. We found a signifi-
cant indirect effect of condition on moral judgments (10,000 Bootstrapped Samples; Effect:
-.0295; 95% CI: lower bound = -.0846, upper bound = -.0017). However, the direct effect of
condition remained significant (Effect: -.7150; 95% CI: lower bound = -1.004, upper bound =
-.4258) indicating that emotional reactions only partially mediated the effect of condition on
moral judgments. The size of the mediating effect relative to the direct effect is also revealing:
although differences in feelings of anger and disgust did account for differences in participants’
moral judgments about personal and impersonal dilemmas (as the correlation suggests), much
of this difference is likely still attributable to other factors.
General Discussion
The present experiments constitute a direct investigation of the role of emotion in people’s
judgments of moral dilemmas. Our findings indicate that, as with simple norm violations,
anger and disgust play a role in judgments of moral dilemmas. We found that moral dilemmas
elicited strong emotional reactions, and that personal dilemmas elicited significantly stronger
emotional responses than did impersonal dilemmas. In addition, we found that participants’
experience of anger and disgust were significantly correlated with their moral judgments. How-
ever, our findings also suggest that the relationship between emotional reactions and judg-
ments of moral dilemmas is weaker than initially hypothesized. Although the relationship
between anger and moral judgment was statistically significant, the correlations between par-
ticipants’ emotional responses and their moral judgments are conventionally considered small,
as was emotion’s mediating effect on participants’moral judgments.
Clearly, our findings are not the last word on the role of emotion in people’s judgments of
moral dilemmas. As discussed, there have been several investigations that seem to demonstrate
the role of emotion in moral judgments about simple norm violations (e.g., [5, 8–12]). In addi-
tion, recent investigations claim to show a link between emotion and people’s judgments of
moral dilemmas using new and more tightly controlled materials that may not suffer from the
confounds present in the standard battery (e.g., [50]). Likewise, there is evidence that impair-
ments in empathy can lead to abnormal moral judgments (e.g., [54–56]), suggesting that
proper affective functioning is a necessary, but perhaps not a sufficient condition, for making
moral judgments. However, our findings still offer important insights on the role of emotion in
moral judgment. First, extant research in moral psychology makes it difficult to interpret the
strength of the relationship between specific emotional responses and judgments of moral
dilemmas. Our findings are novel in this respect, demonstrating a link between emotions like
disgust and hostility and moral disapproval in dilemmatic contexts. However, our findings also
suggest that this relationship is weaker than anticipated by many researchers. Thus, our
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findings make room for the possibility that dual-process theories—in particular, those that
attempt to explain differences in people’s judgments of personal and impersonal dilemmas by
appealing to the emotions these dilemmas elicit—are incomplete.
Limitations and Future Directions
Self-report emotion measures afford two advantages for assessing the role of emotion in judgments
of moral dilemmas. First, these measures allow us to identify the specific emotions experienced dur-
ing judgments of moral dilemmas. Until now, it was unclear that anger and disgust, rather than
guilt, for example, support people’s judgments of moral dilemmas. Second, self-report emotion
measures allow us to assess the strength of the relationship between particular emotional responses
and people’s moral judgments. These measures also have some clear limitations.
Awareness and sensitivity of self-report measures. Self-report measures require partici-
pants to be consciously aware of their emotional state and be able to accurately report those
states. This raises two potential concerns: First, this limitation prevents our experiments from
addressing how unconscious emotional processing may have influenced moral judgments (e.g.
[57]). It is clear that further investigation on the link between unconscious emotional responses
and judgments of moral dilemmas is warranted, and not at all addressed by the present studies.
Second, even if the relevant emotions are consciously experienced, one might worry whether
the PANAS-X are sufficiently sensitive to detect the emotional states that drive moral judg-
ments. Along these lines, one might worry that we used wrong subscales to measure the con-
nection between emotions and moral judgments. Several points speak against the second
concern: For one, we not only tested differences between the emotions elicited by personal and
impersonal dilemmas, but also tested for differences in participants’ emotions before and after
reading a moral dilemma. We observed that reading a moral dilemma had a strong effect on
participants’ emotional states. These main effects indicate that the emotions we measured are
induced during moral decision-making and that the PANAS-X scales are sufficiently sensitive
to detect these effects. Moreover, we provided further validation of our measure by replicating
the original emotion differences found in prior research using the items from the standard
battery.
Disruption of normal operations of emotion and judgment. Another disadvantage to
self-report emotion measures is that they explicitly direct participants’ attention toward their
emotional responses, whereas in more naturalistic settings participants may experience and be
influenced by emotions without explicitly attending to them. This potentially threatens to dis-
rupt the normal connections between emotional responses and moral judgments. If partici-
pants are made aware of their emotions they may work to discount them in making their
judgments, potentially weakening their connection. Alternatively, participants might feel a
demand pressure to make judgments that align with their emotion ratings. Either situation is
undesirable from the researcher's perspective. We recognize that ruling out these concerns may
require implicit emotion measures that do not direct participants’ attention toward their emo-
tional reactions.
Future directions. A number of future directions are suggested by the limitations of prior
research, as well as the limitations of the present studies. First, we identified potentially serious
confounds in the standard battery of dilemmas that have been used in moral judgment
research. As our norming study demonstrates, the revised battery (originally developed by
Moore et al. [26]) avoids these confounds and so may be better suited for examining the factors
that influence people’s judgments of moral dilemmas.
Future studies might also employ methods capable of measuring unconscious emotional
experiences, such as facial expression coding [58] or the measurement of facial muscle activity
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using electromyography (e.g., [59]). Like galvanic skin response measures (GSR), these meth-
ods allow researchers to examine unconscious emotional experiences, yet they also allow
researchers to differentiate between different types of emotions. Coupled with carefully con-
trolled and normed materials, these methods might reveal a greater role of unconscious emo-
tions in judgments of moral dilemmas. In addition, these methods would allow researchers to
measure emotional reactions without affecting participants’ attention during the decision-mak-
ing process.
Finally, our findings suggest that occurrent emotions (those experienced during the process
of judgment) have only a relatively small role in judgments of moral dilemmas. Still, moral
judgments might be more strongly influenced by people’s anticipated emotions, or how people
imagine they would feel having taken one or another action (e.g., [60]). Anticipated emotions
play an important role in many judgment and decision contexts (e.g., [61–65]), so we might
expect that they also influence moral judgments. However, we also think that this idea departs
from the claim that alarm bell emotions lead to deontological judgments in personal moral
dilemmas (or high-conflict personal dilemmas). Nevertheless, the influence of anticipated
emotions in the context of moral dilemmas warrants further examination.
Conclusion
There has never really been any question as to whether emotions play some role in moral deci-
sion-making—even Kant [1, 66] recognized that “sympathies” and “sentiments” are integral to
proper moral functioning. Rather, the more substantive concerns are the relative contribution
of emotion to people’s moral judgments and whether or not emotion plays an important role
in people’s judgments of moral dilemmas. Our findings suggest that emotions (especially anger
and disgust) are involved in judgments of moral dilemmas, but that their role in producing
these judgments may be weaker than we once thought.
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